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BS39535669

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**MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE VISITING SHIPS PANEL (NUCLEAR)
HELD AT DEPT OF DEFENCE RUSSELL OFFICES IN ROOM [REDACTED] ON 10
MARCH 2022**

Attendees:

RADM R. (Rachel) Durbin

CDRE M. (Mark) Sander

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

Head Navy Engineering (Chair)

NPSTF

IP DIV

HNE COS

NPSO

JHC

SONPW

NPSO (Secretary)

ANSTO

ANSTO

ARPANSA

ARPANSA

NEMA

DSTG

DFAT

DFAT

DHAC

IP DIV

IP DIV

Apologies:

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

Ms B. (Belinda) Jago

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

[REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

MAROPS

DAFF

DCCEEW

DFAT

ITEM 1: OPENING

1. The Chair, RADM Rachel Durbin (RAN), declared the meeting open at 1013.

ITEM 2: WELCOME AND APOLOGIES

2. The Chair welcomed Panel members to the meeting and thanked all for their attendance. The Chair noted the importance of managing the meetings time to allow for a discussion of lessons learnt from Western Australia's 'missing source' event. The Secretary, [REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant (RAN) tendered apologies from Panel members who were unable to attend the meeting.

ITEM 3: CONFIRMATION OF THE PREVIOUS MEETINGS MINUTES

3. The Secretary outlined that the minutes had been distributed for comment and requested those Panel members present at the previous Visiting Ship Panel (Nuclear) (VSP(N)) meeting to confirm the minutes of the last meeting. Acceptance of the minutes was proposed the Secretary and seconded by [REDACTED] s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant (RAN).

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Decision: Minutes accepted.

ITEM 4: MATTERS ARISING

4/1/Feb 21 – Reference Accident

4. [REDACTED] (ARPANSA) provided an update on two sub-projects of interest to the committee being conducted by ARPANSA. The first was outlined as work with consultants to provide a ‘core estimate comparative analysis’ with an interim report expected Apr 23. That report will be distributed to the Panel for comment; [REDACTED] (ARPANSA) requested a quick response to the review of that report so project can progress as planned. The second sub-project discussion outlined the development of the ‘accident sequence comparative analysis’ looking at accident scenarios and their subsequent likelihood. As part of this process the term ‘accident’ may be changed to the term ‘incident’. The interim report is expected in Jul 23 and will be submitted to the Panel for comment. Again, [REDACTED] (ARPANSA) requested an expedited response to that report to progress its development in a timely matter. Delivery of the final product is scheduled for release in Dec 23.

Decision: ARPANSA to continue development of the two reports with submission to the Panel for comment in Apr 23 and Jul 23, respectively.

For Action: ARPANSA.

4/2/Oct 21 – Review of OPSMAN 1

5. [REDACTED] (RAN) stated that OPSMAN 1 - Edition 11 has been reviewed by the relevant stakeholders and had been submitted to be included as part of the defence policy admin framework. [REDACTED] (RAN) outlined that the document was ready for review and approval by the Chair. The Chair confirmed with the Panel that there were no outstanding matters of concern and indicated that her office would approve the document for publication.

Decision: OHNE to review and formally approve the current drafted version of OPSMAN 1 – Edition 11.

Action: SONPW/OHNE

4/3/Jun 22 – NPW Resource Analysis and Costing: NPW Visit Vignettes

6. HNE Chief of Staff, [REDACTED] (RAN) thanked the relevant parties for their input which resulted in a generation of a staff paper at the end of 2022 to seek supplementary funding for the new financial year. This funding request included support for internal supplementation for OHNE, the reference accident, operational support and test equipment. [REDACTED] (RAN) stated that the request had progressed and is at the final stage of internal defence approval with an expectation to receive feedback and subsequent formal approval in the next month. [REDACTED] (RAN) highlighted that [REDACTED] would then discuss the outcome with ARPANSA and ANSTO with the view of acquiring previously discussed equipment this financial year, limited to what will be achieved for delivery by 30 Jun 23.

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7. [REDACTED] (ANSTO) stated that ANSTO has incorporated the resource impact statement for procurement of equipment in support of Defence to their finance group. Feedback received internally is that the request is progressing well. The ANSTO legal department has outline there is an MOU for shared resources and that may be used to support the request. Further detail to be shared between OHNE and ANSTO outside the meeting.

8. [REDACTED] (ARPANSA) outlined that ARPANSA had budgeted for the current NPW visit, however future funding to support visits would be billed on an 'as required' basis. [REDACTED] (RAN) outlined that funding of operational support may cover items including travel, accommodation, and movement of stores. [REDACTED] (RAN) stated that funding can be approved for future activities but not used to reimburse historical activities.

9. s 33(a)(iii) - Security [REDACTED]

10. s 33(a)(iii) - Security [REDACTED]

11. The Chair acknowledged the tension in the forecast increase to NPW visit frequency and stated the system to support funding needs to be actively managed; The Chair stated she believed this matter to be in-hand and understood by the COS.

Decision: COS to seek funding approval and liaise with ANSTO and ARPANSA to discuss outcomes of the submission.

For Action: COS

4/4/Aug 22 – Darwin NPW Validation

12. The Secretary outlined that that the previous Chair had stated that the Port Of Darwin NPW port validation was to be conducted in the first quarter of 2023. The Secretary highlighted that due to extenuating circumstances the Northern Territory had formally requested the validation be deferred and re-scheduled for 27 Apr 23. OHNE had approved the request and the TWG would conduct the assessment on the prescribed date.

Decision: TWG to conduct the validation on the prescribed date.

For Action: TWG

ITEM 5: NEW BUSINESS

5/1/Mar 23 – MAROPS Report

13. [REDACTED] (RAN) provided advice on behalf of MAROPS outlining that they were not tracking an NPW visit in the proceeding 90 days. Further advice indicated there would likely be an NPW visit as part of Exercise Talisman Sabre 23, scheduled Jul-Aug 23. The location of the visit is yet to be confirmed with further details in due course.

5/2/Oct 22 – 2022 Seminar Outcomes

14. The Secretary outlined that the 2022 Seminar Outcomes tracking spreadsheet had been distributed to the Panel by email for comment. The Chair asked for feedback on the delivery of the 2022 Seminar with [REDACTED] (ARPANSA) indicating a really positive and engaging response from state-based participants who don't contribute to the VSP(N) on a quarterly basis. [REDACTED] indicated that the National Exercise Program discussed at the seminar was being adopted as part of the 'after action review' by ARPANSA and ANSTO in response to the WA 'missing source' event. Such a National Training and Exercise Program is under discussion by ARPANSA and ANSTO as a possible future new policy proposal. [REDACTED] (ANSTO) outlined the significance of networking among the States and highlighted the importance of the ability to discuss their shared experiences in the forum.

15. [REDACTED] (RAN) outlined that there may be merit to holding a shortened or compressed version of the NPW seminar. [REDACTED] (RAN) and [REDACTED] (ARPANSA) outlined their concerns noting the forecast NPW activities already scheduled for the proceeding calendar year. The Chair requested consideration for the continuation of a compressed variation of the VSP(N) Seminar to progress the outstanding outcomes.

16. [REDACTED] (NEMA) outlined that NEMA continues to develop a plan for broader review of their emergency response plans as per the outcomes tracker and further advice would be sought on completion of the meeting. Roles and responsibilities for a media strategy would need further consideration and NEMA would look at providing further advice at the next meeting. [REDACTED] (DFAT) outlined that DFAT would be interested in being involved in the progression of that outcome with regard to the legal implications at an international level.

Decision: TWG to consider the continuation of a compressed variation of the VSP(N) seminar to progress the outstanding outcomes.

For Action: TWG

s 33(a)(iii) - Security

17. **s 33(a)(iii) - Security**
[REDACTED]

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18. s 33(a)(iii) - Security

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

s 33 - security

[Redacted]

19. s 33(a)(iii) - Security

[Redacted]

20. s 33(a)(iii) - Security

[Redacted]

21. s 33(a)(iii) - Security

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

22. s 33(a)(iii) - Security

[Redacted]

23. s 33(a)(iii) - Security

[Redacted]

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s 33(a)(iii) - Security

5/6/Mar 23 – Port of Gladstone Categorisation Change

24. [REDACTED] (RAN) outlined the clear guidance outlining Defence priorities for validating ports for NPW visits. As such, Port of Gladstone will be validated initially as a secondary port in 2023 and then as a primary port in 2024. The validation of Gladstone as a primary port will provide an example of how a large commercial port can be developed and subsequently validated to support NPW visits. [REDACTED] (RAN) outlined the interest in validating HMAS *Coonawarra's* new wharf in 2024 to support NPW. [REDACTED] outlined the planning constraints for that validation with special reference to the proximity of accommodated Defence members and their families in service accommodation adjacent the wharves.

25. [REDACTED] (RAN) outlined the extensive level of planning, modelling, assessment and infrastructure development involved in validating a new berth at Barney Point in Gladstone, QLD. As a result of constraints to berthing NPW at other facilities including Boyne Smelter and Fisherman's Landing, consideration is sought for the development of Barney Point.

26. [REDACTED] (RAN) indicated that the preferred course of action to validate the new primary ports (Gladstone and Darwin) would mean awaiting the promulgation of the new Reference Accident and assess against the updated policy in 2024; The Chair endorsed the plan.

Decision: TWG to plan validation of the Port of Gladstone (Barney Point Wharf) as a primary port prior to 30 Jun 24 under the new reference accident.

For Action: TWG

s 33(a)(i) - Security

27. [REDACTED]

28. [REDACTED]

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s 33(a)(i) - Security

5/7/Mar 23 – WA Missing Source Lessons Learnt

29. [REDACTED] (ANSTO) provided a detailed recount of the sequence of events involving the loss and consequent search for the missing radiation source in Western Australia. [REDACTED] outlined the importance of media liaison for consistent messaging to manage public concern, highlighting the effectiveness of the State, ANSTO and ARPANSA's collaborative approach to public relations.

30. [REDACTED] (ANSTO) outlined the importance of responding agencies operational readiness and how that needs to be implemented to meet the requests for support from a state at short notice (sighting ANSTO's policy of three-hour's notice to deploy). [REDACTED] indicated in [REDACTED] response that [REDACTED] would like to see state requests for assistance arrive earlier, noting the likelihood of eventual deployment of Commonwealth intervention was inevitable.

31. [REDACTED] (ANSTO) outlined that each of the states have Chemical Biological Radiation Nuclear (CBRN) committees and that [REDACTED] would like to see ARPANSA and ANSTO in advisory representation, resulting in participation in their respective community of practice.

32. [REDACTED] (ARPANSA) outlined that ARPANSA had conducted an after action review indicating that the operational readiness to support an incident of this nature had been eroded due to efficiency dividends and staffing level caps. [REDACTED] indicated that the organisation would like to rectify these deficiencies to be in a better position to respond. The Chair asked [REDACTED] (ARPANSA) about the time frame to reform the deficiencies to which [REDACTED] responded by indicating that there were several avenues they would review to support. Despite having the appropriately trained personnel and appropriate equipment, [REDACTED] (ARPANSA) cited changes to operational readiness would support a better outcome in future. [REDACTED] echoed and supported the lessons learnt outlined by [REDACTED] (ANSTO).

33. [REDACTED] (ARPANSA) outlined the concept of Commonwealth-led 'road-shows' conducting training and exercise programs with all states and territories biennially. [REDACTED] indicated that it may eventuate as a new policy proposal within ARPANSA or a joint policy proposal with ANSTO in the 'emergency preparedness and response' area. [REDACTED] indicated conceptual support from Defence and would provide further detail in due course.

34. [REDACTED] (ANSTO) highlighted the overall success in inter-organisational operability between Defence, ANSTO and ARPANSA but outlined there may be need to further understand each of our equipment resources for appraisal within the partnership. [REDACTED] outlined the importance of growing the cooperation between agencies so that when we are required to deploy there exists a common understanding with regard to roles and responsibilities. [REDACTED] outlined that if we required assistance from other nations in support of an incident, we would have a better capacity to support their involvement.

35. [REDACTED] (ARPANSA) outlined ARPANSA's planning of an Emergency Preparedness Review over the coming three to five years. This initiative is an International Atomic Energy Agency peer-reviewed process of reviewing procedures and arrangements in response to incidents. Further details with regard to this process would be provided as information to the Panel in future.

36. [Redacted] (ARPANSA) stated the importance of pre-visit and validation activities in response to WA’s missing source. The Chair agreed with [Redacted] (ARPANSA) comments.

37. [Redacted] (ANSTO) wanted it known by the Panel that the ‘Coris360®’ device developed by ANSTO had located the missing source. In [Redacted] admission though, [Redacted] outlined that any one unit involved in the search would have located the source also. [Redacted] highlighted that the device could be useful for both commercial and governmental purposes.

38. s 33(a)(iii) - Security [Redacted]

39. The Chair asked the Panel whether they were aware of any consequences as a result of the actions by the civilian organisation to which [Redacted] (ARPANSA) indicated that the state-based regulatory investigation is ongoing. Additionally, [Redacted] (ARPANSA) indicated that the lessons ‘learnt’ would preferably be referred to as lessons ‘identified’.

40. The Chair thanked ARPANSA and ANSTO for the opportunity to hear about the demonstration of their respective capabilities.

ITEM 6: OTHER BUSINESS

41. The Chair offered an opportunity to identify other business. Nil further business was raised.

ITEM 7: NEXT MEETING

42. The Chair concluded by thanking everyone for their attendance, acknowledging the positive work prior to her commencement in the role of Chair. The Chair acknowledged the adaptability of the teams responsible for NPW visits, with special reference to Port Services – West, Western Australia Police and the Port of Fremantle in their response to changes in the visiting NPW’s program.

43. The next meeting will be held in the Department of Defence Offices, Canberra on Wednesday 29 June 2023 at 1000-1200 in room [Redacted]. The meeting was closed at 1149.

Rachel.D
urbin
RA Durbin, CSC
RADM, RAN
Chair

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by Rachel.Durbin
Date: 2023.04.10
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[Redacted] Digitally signed by
[Redacted]
Date: 2023.03.24
07:33:38 +08'00'
[Redacted]
[Redacted] RAN
Secretary

Enclosure:

- 1. ARPANSA Reference Accident Project Report – March 2023

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Distribution List:

RADM R. (Rachel) Durbin

CDRE M. (Mark) Sander

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

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s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

Ms B. (Belinda) Jago

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

For Information:

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant

Head Navy Engineering (Chair)

NPSTF

IP DIV

HNE COS

NPSO

MAROPS

JHC

SONPW

NPSO (Secretary)

ANSTO

ANSTO

ARPANSA

ARPANSA

NEMA

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MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE VISITING SHIPS PANEL (NUCLEAR) HELD AT DEPT OF DEFENCE RUSSELL OFFICES ON ROOM [REDACTED] ON 29 JUNE 2023

Attendees:

RADM R. (Rachel) Durbin	HNE (Chair)
[REDACTED]	HNE (Chief of Staff)
[REDACTED]	NPSO
[REDACTED]	JHC
[REDACTED]	MAROPS
[REDACTED]	ARPANSA
[REDACTED]	ARPANSA
[REDACTED]	NEMA
[REDACTED]	NEMA
[REDACTED]	DSTG
[REDACTED]	DFAT
[REDACTED]	DHAC
[REDACTED]	ASA
[REDACTED]	DCCEEW
[REDACTED]	NFPB
[REDACTED]	HNE (Secretary)
[REDACTED]	HNE (Staff Officer)

Apologies:

CDRE M. (Mark) Sander	ASA
[REDACTED]	IP DIV
[REDACTED]	HNE (Staff Officer)
[REDACTED]	ANSTO
[REDACTED]	ANSTO
[REDACTED]	ARPANSA
[REDACTED]	IP DIV
[REDACTED]	IP DIV
[REDACTED]	DCCEEW

ITEM 1: OPENING

1. The Chair, RADM Rachel Durbin (RAN), declared the meeting open at 1330.

ITEM 2: WELCOME AND APOLOGIES

2. The Chair welcomed the panel members making note of new attendees who were representing absent existing panel members. The Secretary made special mention of the late withdrawal in attendance of [REDACTED] (ANSTO) due to [REDACTED]

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ITEM 3: PREVIOUS MINUTES

3. The Secretary informed the panel that the minutes from the last meeting have been distributed for comment with no further correspondence received. Acceptance of the previous minutes was proposed by the Chair and accepted by the panel.

Decision: Minutes accepted

ITEM 4: MATTERS ARISING

4/1/Feb 21 – Reference Accident

4. [REDACTED] (ARPANSA) was invited to update the panel on the status of the Reference Accident. [REDACTED] informed the panel that the project was tracking to the proposed plan timeline. Project One was provided to the VSP(N) in March 2023 for comment, however, no further comments were received. Project One was therefore completed in March and finalised in April. Project Two is currently tracking for completion in August with a subsequent consultation period. [REDACTED] informed the panel that on completion of both projects, a meeting and/or workshop will be proposed with the TWG in September to work through the findings of Project One and Two which will direct the writing of the preliminary report.

5. The Chair then invited members to highlight any issues around scheduling for engagement. No queries or issues were raised around scheduling for engagement.

Decision: ARPANSA to continue with progression of Project Two for review and discussion at the next meeting.

4/2/Oct 2021 – Review of OPSMAN 1

6. The Secretary tendered apologies for [REDACTED] (RAN) and deferred to [REDACTED] (RAN) for an update on the status of the OPSMAN 1 review. [REDACTED] (RAN) informed the panel that the OPSMAN 1, Edition 11 review was complete, accepted and formally signed by HNE. [REDACTED] (RAN) informed the panel that this edition would be the final review of the document before the transition to the new regulatory system. Minor changes may be accepted in some circumstances.

7. The Chair thanked the panel for the positive engagement in support of the review and thanked all for their input.

Decision: The Secretary to distribute OPSMAN 1 Edition 11 to relevant parties and supplied for publication on the ARPANSA website.

4/3/May 23 - Review of Port Validation Outcomes

8. The Secretary informed the panel that port validation activities had been conducted in Hobart, Darwin, and Brisbane since the March 2023 VSP(N) meeting.

9. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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s 33(a)(iii) - Security

10. [REDACTED] (RAN) informed the panel that both Port of Darwin and Port of Brisbane has been endorsed and approved by HNE. [REDACTED] explained that the exercises run by both ports were satisfactory with no significant areas of concern. [REDACTED] outlined that the Brisbane NPWVC was coordinating the Gladstone port validation. Discussions with the Brisbane Chair (also the Gladstone Chair) indicated there was a significant amount of work to progress Gladstone's NPWVC organisation, emergency preparedness and response structure to support a validation. The Gladstone Chair requested input from NEMA in plan development. Intention is for the Master Attendant to inspect Gladstone in late 2023 with the view of primary validation activities and endorsement to occur in the second quarter of 2024.

11. [REDACTED] (RAN) informed the panel that the Port of Melbourne pre-visit has been conducted and all indicators at this time suggest Melbourne will be in a position to be validated in October 2023. [REDACTED] then informed the panel that discussion initiated from the Office of HNE (OHNE), querying the need to validate Melbourne as soon as October, noting the current resource drain with multiple port validations and visits. The Chair then clarified the matter, explaining that the increase in operational visits had created resource tension and that validation decisions should be made with a full understanding of the resource pull on the primary stakeholders. The Chair then invited feedback from the major stakeholders on this subject.

12. [REDACTED] (RAN) explained that Darwin had been validated due to a prospective visit which had since been cancelled. [REDACTED] explained the prolonged process of Darwin's validation to the panel; a validation made difficult due to the absence of visits and included the failure to successfully complete the first exercise, before demonstrating the required competencies at the subsequent exercise. [REDACTED] then detailed the primary lessons learnt from the Darwin validation process being:

- a. A lack of recent port validations due to reasons including COVID and shortage of resourcing. [REDACTED] expressed the need for a prioritised port validation schedule due to the increase in operational visit tempo;
- b. Ports that historically had fewer visits appeared to not been adequately planning, resourcing and executing validation activities; and,
- c. NEMA participation in the validation process was invaluable. The representative was able to clarify the flow of emergency information, requests and available resources. [REDACTED], on behalf of the VSP(N), requested the presence of a state NEMA liaison officer at future meetings. [REDACTED] (ARPANSA) echoed the importance of a NEMA representative and their invaluable input during validation processes.

13. [REDACTED] (NEMA) informed the panel that the NEMA representative that attended the Darwin validation activities had also reported the positive interaction and information exchange. [REDACTED] also explained that NEMA was undertaking a restructure which will enable greater state engagement, with state-based liaison officers.

14. The Chair explained that although the VSP(N) was the current lead agency for nuclear

visits with the transition to a *Nuclear Navy* there was an increased need to liaise with state and national level emergency management agencies to develop ways to respond at a national level.

Decision – TWG to engage in support of a priority port validation schedule in an attempt to reduce the resource burden on agencies at both federal and state level.

s 33(a)(iii) - Security

15. **s 33(a)(iii) - Security**
[Redacted]

ITEM 5: NEW BUSINESS ITEMS

s 33(a)(iii) - Security

16. **s 33(a)(iii) - Security**
[Redacted]

s 33(a)(iii) - Security

17. **s 33(a)(iii) - Security**
[Redacted]

s 33(a)(iii) - Security

18. **s 33(a)(iii) - Security**
[Redacted]

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s 33(a)(iii) - Security
[Redacted]

19. The Chair informed the attendees that OHNE require panel feedback within three months. As such, the intention is to engage in a focused discussion at the next VSP(N) meeting in September 2023. The Chair also requested draft resource impact statements be submitted prior to the September VSP(N) meeting, to facilitate discussion by the panel at the meeting. The Chair stated her intent to brief Chief of Navy and ASA of VSP(N) capability thereafter. The Chair highlighted that should agencies identify significant resource concern, it is requested that early identification and discussion with OHNE be sought.

s 33(a)(iii) - Security
[Redacted]

ITEM 6 – OTHER BUSINESS

6/1/Jun 23

20. [Redacted] (RAN) informed the Chair that a drafted security plan will be forwarded to the Master Attendant for revision and comment. The Secretary informed the Chair that it would be reviewed and discussed by the TWG.

s 33(a)(iii) - Security
[Redacted]

21. s 33(a)(iii) - Security
[Redacted]

ITEM 7 – NEXT MEETING

22. The next meeting has been scheduled in the Department of Defence Offices, Canberra, on 21 September 2023 at 1400–1600 in room [Redacted]. The Chair concluded the meeting by thanking everyone for their attendance.

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23. The meeting was closed at 1418.

Rachel Durbin
Digitally signed by Rachel.Durbin
Date: 2023.07.25 17:35:43 +10'00'

RA Durbin, CSC
RADM, RAN
Chair

s 47F - Privacy
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Date: 2023.08.07 13:21:27 +08'00'

2

s 47F - Privacy
s 47F - Privacy RAN
Secretary


Enclosures:

- 1. NPW Visits – s 33(a)(iii) - Security

Distribution:

RADM R. (Rachel) Durbin
CDRE M. (Mark) Sander

s 47F - Privacy, s 22(1)(a)(ii) - Irrelevant



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- HNE (Chief of Staff)
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- IP DIV
- HNE (Secretary)
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s 33(a)(iii) - Security

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